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Abstract
This note provides a detailed account of the development of the EU enlargement law. Based on the 
material provided by the latest enlargement round, it outlines the main set of enlargement 
principles, criteria and procedural tools employed by the Union in the process, also making a 
sketch of the actual chronology of enlargement events. Based on the analysis of the legal regulation 
of five rounds of enlargement and making parallels with the notion of customary law as understood 
in public international law, it argues that the Union enlargements have always enjoyed a dual 
regulation: by written (mostly Treaty based) and also by customary enlargement law. The existence 
of customary law explains the consistency of enlargement regulation throughout all the rounds of 
this process, notwithstanding the stage of the Treaty reform in force at the time of every particular 
accession. The minimal amendments introduced into the enlargement article by the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Art. I-58) suggest that the future enlargements are likely to 
be building on the body of customary law in force to date. The process of gradual incorporation of 
customary law into the written law of the EU is also likely to continue. 
Kurzfassung
Dieses Papier zeichnet die Entwicklung des Erweiterungsrechts der EU detailliert nach. Basierend 
auf den Unterlagen der letzten Erweiterungsrunde behandelt es die wesentlichen 
Erweiterungsprinzipien, die Kriterien und Verfarhen, welche von der Union in diesem Prozess 
angewendet wurden, und entwirft auch eine Chronologie des Erweiterungsgeschehens. Auf Basis 
einer Analyse der gesetzlichen Regulierung von fünf Erweiterungsrunden und indem Parallelen 
zum völkerrechtlichen Begriff des Gewohnheitsrechts gezogen werden, wird argumentiert, dass die 
Erweiterungen der Union immer durch eine zweifache Regulierung geprägt waren: Durch 
geschriebenes (vorwiegend auf den Verträgen basierendes) Recht und auch durch 
Gewohnheitsrecht. Die Existenz von Gewohnheitsrecht erklärt die Konsistenz von 
Erweiterungsbestimmungen durch alle Erweiterungsrunden, ungeachtet der Phase der 
Vertragsreform, die zum Zeitpunkt der jeweiligen Erweiterung in Kraft war. Die minimalen 
Änderungen des Erweiterungsartikels, wie sie durch den Verfassungsvertrag eingeführt werden 
(Art. I-58) legen nahe, dass zukünftige Erweiterungen wahrscheinlich wiederum auf der 
Gesamtheit des bis heute gültigen Gewohnheitsrechts aufbauen werden. Der Prozess der 
schrittweisen Aufnahme von Gewohnheitsrecht in das geschriebene Recht der EU wird sich also 
voraussichtlich ebenso fortsetzen. 
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Introduction  
Already with the first enlargement round it became clear that there are considerable differences 
between the way the EU enlargement process is inscribed in the Treaty (three Treaties back then: 
ECSC, Euratom and EEC) and the way EU enlargements are conducted in practice. The EU Treaty 
still omits a number of crucial elements of enlargement law, including the main principles of the 
enlargement process, some of the criteria that applicant States have to satisfy in order to have 
reasonable aspirations to join the Union and even the real sequence of enlargement events. The 
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Nous ne pouvons nous arrêter quand autour de 
nous le monde entier est en mouvement. Ai-je 
assez fait comprendre que la Communauté que 
nous avons créée n’a pas sa fin en elle-même?  
Jean Monnet(1)  
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The last enlargement of the European Union followed the pattern, established by the four previous 
enlargements, and contributed to widening the gap between the enlargement routine and the way 
enlargements are regulated by the Treaty to a scale, unknown before. This was mostly due to its 
complexity and scale, and also due to the nature of the majority of the applicant States, faced with 
the need not only to adapt to the requirements of membership of the European Union, but also to 
build up their whole legal and economic structure anew on the ruins of the communist past.  
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe failed (or demonstrated the reluctance of the 
Union) to bridge this gap between the legal text and reality. When this document comes into force, it 
is unlikely to bring any drastic changes to the way enlargements of the European Union are 
regulated. In other words, not only the next enlargement, to include Romania and Bulgaria, but also 
further enlargement rounds, will take place in the atmosphere of a ‘split’ legal regulation.  
The complexity of contemporary enlargement law, which includes a number of relevant EU Treaty 
articles (most notably 6(1) and 49) and basic principles of EU law, as well as a body of “soft law”, 
including the Copenhagen criteria and a body of the Copenhagen related documents (Kochenov 
(2004a): 5), some of them falling in between legal and political regulation, and also specific 
principles and criteria of enlargement law proper, which cannot always be traced to the text of the 
Treaties, can sometimes lead to terminological confusions. In order to make the terminology used as 
clear as possible, alongside with ‘enlargement law’, which suggests the use of primarily legal 
sources in the discussion, this paper operates the term ‘enlargement regulation’ (or ‘the regulation of 
enlargement process’), which is a system of legal and political documents and practices applied by 
the European Union in the course of the preparation of enlargements. This term should not be 
confused with Regulations as sources of Community law (Art. 249 EC). To make this distinction 
clearer, in cases when a reference to a Regulation in the sense of Art. 249 EC is made, the first letter 
of the word is capitalised. This terminology allows one to discuss the evolution of enlargement law 
(i. e. the Treaty text and relevant secondary Community law) alongside the evolution of enlargement 
regulation, making a clear distinction between the two. See figure 1 for a graphic representation of 
this relationship.  
Figure 1 
There are quite a number of scholarly works dealing with the regulation of the enlargement process 
of the European Union and its implications for the future development of Europe (Cremona (2003); 
Beurdeley (2003); Ott and Inglis (2002)).(2) While scholars generally agree that the provisions of the 
Treaty represent an ‘imperfect guide to enlargement’ (Avery and Cameron (1998): 23; Tucny 
(2000): 78), are ‘vague and open’ (Hillion (2002): 402), or, more mildly, ‘only outline the most 
general principles of the process’ (Isaac (1989): 26), and ‘se caractérise par concision’ (Beurdeley 
(2003): 42), enlargement scholars do not, however, concur on how the existing enlargement 
regulation should be characterised.  
The analysis usually focuses on the ‘classical enlargement method’ (Preston (1997): 9), rooted in the 
community method of integration (Ibid.: 8) or on the outlining of a set of ‘enlargement 
principles’ (Maniokas (2000); Booß and Forman (1995): 100). Only rarely do scholars talk about the 
customary (Fierro (2003): 137)(3) regulation of the enlargement process.  
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At the same time, the classical enlargement method and the principles governing the enlargement 
process can be viewed as a fusion of the elements of customary enlargement regulation and 
constructive interpretation of the Treaties. It is thus possible to observe that all the rounds of 
enlargement were largely governed by a fusion of customary and Treaty law, as opposed to the 
black-letter text of the Treaties. Every upcoming enlargement regulation tended to build on this body 
of customary law.  
The story of evolution of the customary enlargement law in not over: the next expansion to 
accommodate Bulgaria, Romania and, later, Croatia and probably Turkey will not be the last one. It 
is likely that a number of other European states will follow, putting enlargements on the agenda of 
the Union for a very long time. It is even possible that the Union is entering a permanent 
enlargement process (Manin (2001): 59).  
Why is it instrumental to talk about customary enlargement law while discussing the enlargement 
regulation? How did it evolve and what is its future? What are the main elements of the customary 
enlargement law and the role played by custom in the enlargement regulation?  
In search for some answers to these questions this note will start (in Section one) with a concise 
overview of the stages of development of enlargement regulation triggered by the revisions of the 
Treaties. It will also discuss the possible interpretations of the Treaty text governing enlargements at 
different stages of its development and will focus on assessing different possible interpretations of 
Article 49 TEU and its predecessors pointing out to the time and the causes of creation of the 
customary enlargement regulation. As a result of this overview of a step-by-step development of 
enlargement regulation, the roots of the customary enlargement law of the European Union will be 
outlined.  
Further, (in Section two) the article will make a comparison between the actual enlargement 
regulation, as it stands after the Fifth enlargement and the text of the EU Treaty. Emphasis will be 
made on the differences between what can be found in the Treaties and the way enlargements are 
regulated in practice. The result of this exercise will be an identification of what is missing from the 
Treaty’s ‘enlargement article’, thus delimitating the possible scope of the customary aspect of the 
EU enlargement law. The incorporation of certain elements of customary enlargement law into the 
text of the Treaties will also be discussed. The second section will provide a detailed overview of the 
enlargement law of the European Union as it stands after the Fifth enlargement.  
The third section will discuss the influence of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, in 
case it is adopted, on the EU enlargement law and its influence on the future enlargement of the 
Union.  
The article will conclude by stating that the EU enlargement regulation, especially after the Fifth 
enlargement, largely represents a concubinage of customary and Treaty enlargement law. The roles, 
played by customary and Treaty law in the process are constantly changing, as new customary norms 
arise and those, previously existing are being constantly incorporated into the Treaties. Thus the 
constantly evolving customary law component of the EU enlargement law largely (with only minor 
exceptions) represents a difference in scope between enlargement regulation and the written EU 
enlargement law, including both the Treaty text and the Copenhagen related documents.  
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Talking about customary law of the EU is not popular among the academics. At present simply no 
literature exists, exploring the possible relation between, on the one hand, the customary law theory 
which evolved in relation to International law and the law of the traditional societies and, on the 
other hand, the law of the European Union.(4) At the same time, it seems, customary law has already 
entered the legal system of the European Union and researchers cannot ignore it any longer, at least 
assessing European enlargement law. As a consequence of the years of academic silence on the 
issue, invoking a customary law argument within the European law context one has no other option 
but to turn to the sources lying outside the scope of EU law.  
In relation with the traditional societies, the quest for customs was compared to the ‘Journey without 
maps’ depicted by Lewis Carroll in The Hunting of the Snark (Allott (2000): 81). And although it is 
not among the goals of this note to go deep into the discussion of the theories of customary law, it is 
necessary to clarify what kind of Snark it is pursuing. Obviously, the existence of a custom is a 
starting point of customary law (van Praag (1915): 23). Custom has historically been defined by 
lawyers as ‘un ensemble d’usages d’ordre juridique qui ont acquis force obligatoire […] par la 
répétition d’actes publics et paisibles pendent un laps de temps relativement long’ (Glissen, (1989) : 
434). In international law a custom is understood as a certain practice generally recognised by states 
of as obligatory (Brownlie (2003): 6; Shaw (2003): 68). The main elements of custom are the actual 
practice of regulation, its uniformity, generality and duration, and opinio juris et necessitatis, or a 
belief that an activity is legally obligatory (Shaw (2003): 80; Brownlie (2003): 8). Duration of 
application element is not necessary, according to Brownlie, once consistence and generality of 
practice are proved (Brownlie (2003): 7).  
Using the understanding of customary law applied in international law, it is possible to state that EU 
enlargement is governed by custom only in case enlargement practice represents consistent 
application of legal principles and criteria, throughout several rounds of enlargement governing the 
accession of a number of new Member States and, at the same time, this practice is considered 
legally binding by all the actors involved and does not make part of the written enlargement law of 
the European Union.  
1. The evolution of enlargement law in the Treaty text: the 
roots of the custom   
All in all, there are five main stages of development of enlargement law of the European 
Communities (Union):(5) 1. Article 98 ECSC; 2. Articles 98 ECSC, 237 EEC and 205 Euratom; 3. 
Articles 237 EEC and 205 Euratom as amended by the SEA and Art.98 ECSC; 4. Article O TEU (all 
the other articles were abrogated); 5.Article 49 TEU (O renumbered) with a reference to Article 6(1) 
TEU.  
To these five stages one might add the 6th stage, which is a possible future development: Article I-58 
of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.  
It is important not to confuse the stages of development of enlargement law with the rounds of 
enlargement. While the former reflects the evolution of the Treaties, the latter is related to the 
widening of the treaties’ geographical scope and is not necessarily related to substantive changes in 
the law. Thus these two processes, although evolving simultaneously, are not synchronised. As a 
result, not all of the stages of enlargement law development were applied in practice. The line of the 
evolution of the Treaty based enlargement law is of importance for the assessment of the 
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Focusing on the roots of the customary component of the EU enlargement law, this section assesses 
the most important historical developments of written enlargement law and customary enlargement 
law of the European Union, providing background for the detailed analysis of the EU enlargement 
law as it stands at present in the second section.  
1.1. Initial stage of the EU enlargement law development (Art. 98 ECSC): no need 
for customary law   
The initial Coal and Steel Community Treaty allowed any ‘European state’ to apply for membership 
and gave the Council almost exclusive powers to deal with such application. Puissochet saw a 
reflection of a supranational approach to enlargement procedure in the ECSC Treaty regulation,(6) 
since all the stages of the process were meant to be fully controlled by the Council. Indeed, Article 
98 ECSC allocated no role in the process to the Member States, stipulating that the application had to 
be submitted to the Council and allowing the Council to determine the terms and conditions of 
accession. Apart from the Council only the High Authority (European Commission) was entrusted 
with a role in the process – it had to submit an Opinion on the application. The accession was to take 
effect when ‘the instrument of accession is received by the Government acting as a depository of the 
[ECSC] Treaty’ (Art. 98 ECSC).  
Article 98 ECSC was detailed enough in order to regulate the accessions to the ECSC Treaty. The 
only problem that might require some clarification was the voting procedure the Council had to use 
in order to accept the application for membership before obtaining the Opinion of the High Authority 
– an issue not clarified by the Treaty.(7)  
It is true that Article 98ECSC alone did not regulate any enlargement process. However, this article 
influenced the interpretation of all other enlargement instruments and, through this influence, 
continues to affect the way enlargements are conducted until now, notwithstanding the fact that the 
article itself was abolished long ago and even the ECSC Treaty seized to exist. The customary law 
currently regulating enlargements of the Union seems to have emerged out of the differences 
between the regulation of enlargements in the ECSC Treaty and in the two other Treaties (EEC and 
Euratom).  
1.2. Supranational vs. intergovernmental: enlargement law after the creation of 
EEC and Euratom, the custom is born   
After the creation of two new Communities in 1957,(8) the aspiring members had to accede to all the 
three Communities at the same time (cf.: infra), which created a crucial link between the three 
accession articles. As if to complicate the matters the enlargement of the EEC and Euratom was built 
around an absolutely different set of principles as compared to the supranationality of Article 98 
ECSC. Unlike the ECSC, EEC and Euratom enlargement articles were rooted in the principle of 
intergovernmentalism: the Member States were given much more powers to regulate the process, 
especially if compared to the ECSC enlargement article.  
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At the same time, the creation of the European Economic Community and Euratom did not change 
the open nature of European integration: just like in the case of ECSC, ‘European states’ were 
entitled to apply. The supranational organs, however, were allocated a much more limited role at all 
stages of the regulation of the process. The texts of the enlargement articles of the EEC Treaty (Art. 
237) and Euratom Treaty (Art. 205) were identical, both stipulating that the application should be 
addressed to the Council, ‘which shall act unanimously after obtaining the Opinion of the 
Commission’ (Arts. 237(1) EEC and 205(1) Euratom). That is to say the procedure of submitting the 
application did not change compared to that of Article 98 ECSC. Further, however, the article made 
the conditions of admission and adjustments of the Treaties subject to the ‘agreement between the 
Member States and the Applicant State’, giving the Council (a leading player in Art.98 ECSC) 
absolutely no role to play at this stage of the process. The formal procedure in order for accession to 
take effect was also changed considerably. Compared to that outlined by the ECSC Treaty: 
according to the EEC and Euratom Treaties, the Accession Treaty had to be ratified by ‘all the 
Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ (Arts. 237(2) 
EEC and 205(2) Euratom).  
To summarise, judging by the text of the Articles, Community organs lost their influence in two out 
of three key stages of the enlargement process.(9) Having said this, it becomes clear that we are 
dealing not with just a ‘slightly different procedure’ as some scholars put it, (e.g. Hoffmeister 
(2002a): 91) but with an essentially different one.  
This difference gave rise to the procedural aspect of the customary enlargement regulation.(10) 
Already during the first enlargement, it became clear that the accession to each of the three 
Communities would not be regulated separately, as the Treaties theoretically prescribed. Unlike what 
one could predict, such a situation did not result in either the ECSC or the EEC model governing the 
whole of enlargement to be adopted,(11) but triggered the crystallization of the procedural aspect of 
the customary enlargement regulation, making the practice of enlargement different from both the 
ECSC and EEC/Euratom regulation standards. The customary regulation was somewhere in between 
the models adopted by ECSC and EEC/Euratom Treaties. The Member States were certainly given a 
role to play, as EEC stipulated, however they chose to meet in Council, as ECSC Treaty demanded. 
The accessions were only possible after the negotiations (as EEC regulation stipulated), at the same 
time, the negotiations presupposed the adherence by the candidate State to the principles of 
enlargement, which amounted, one could argue, to an imposition of the conditions of accession on 
the candidates (as stipulated by ECSC Treaty).  
The resulting procedural facet of the customary enlargement regulation is basically twofold and 
includes:  
z The list of actors, de facto participating in the process (which is different from what can be 
found in the Treaty text (cf.: II.2.a));  
z The chronology of enlargement events, specifying at what stage of the process either actor 
should intervene, which also has little to do with the Treaty text (cf.: II.2.b).  
De jure, judging by the texts of the Treaties, every pre-Maastricht enlargement was regulated by two 
types of Treaty instruments based on totally different principles and resulted in the accession to three
Communities simultaneously. In contrast, in practice, one enlargement was governed by one 
enlargement law, which included Treaty law and customary components, inspired by both the 
models of regulation present in the Treaties and borrowing from both of them.  
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This single regulation arising from the duality of the approaches to be found Treaties was the 
foundation of contemporary enlargement regulation. Further reforms of primary enlargement law 
were unable to alter enlargement practice: all the enlargements starting with the very first one have 
been carried out in accordance with one enlargement law, which has by now proved to be workable 
throughout all the 5 rounds and largely consists of the echo of ECSC regulation intertwined with 
later norms.  
1.3. Further Treaty revisions: separation between the custom and the Treaty text  
The third revision of the written enlargement law contributed to the clarification of the role of the 
institutions of the Communities in the enlargement process. It was brought about by the SEA, which 
gave the European Parliament a role to play in the process. This development, long awaited by 
scholars (Soldatos and Vandersanden (1968): 682), was the last revision of the Treaty regulation of 
enlargement to reflect the change in the institutions participating in the process.  
Compared to the previous Treaty changes, the fourth stage of reform of enlargement instruments 
(among the 5 stages outlined in section 1. supra) was intended to be a far more significant one. The 
Maastricht European Union Treaty introduced significant changes into enlargement regulation, in 
L.W. Gormley’s words, ‘start[ing] to bridge the gaps between the various elements of the 
Union’ (Kapteyn, VerLoren van Themaat and Gormley (1998): 52), including Arts. 98 ECSC, 237 
EEC and 205 Euratom. A single enlargement Article was introduced, crossing out any theoretical 
possibility to join only one of the Communities.(12) However, the heritage of the past divergence 
could not just disappear.  
Article O TEU was a simple restatement of Art.237 EEC (or 205 Euratom). The changes in the text 
of the article were limited to the newly introduced word “Union”. Although all the previous 
enlargement articles were abrogated, the old customary regulation based on the symbiosis of 
supranational and intergovernmental approaches of the earlier instruments (see infrafor details) 
remained in place: the interpretation of the restated Art. 237 EEC (Art. O) proved to be strongly 
influenced by the ‘echo’ of Art. 98 ECSC: the Union organs played a much more important role in 
the process regulated by Art. O alone, than the text of the article would suggest. It would have been 
really naïve to assume that the substitution of three instruments which gave birth to a workable 
practice tested in the course of three enlargements by one single instrument copying two of those 
previously in force would change the situation in the field of de facto regulation.  
Three pre-Maastricht enlargements governed by a custom resulting from a compromise between two 
different approaches to enlargement regulation in the Treaty instruments previously in force had 
prepared a solid base for the future enlargement regulation. As a result, the changes introduced by 
the Maastricht Union Treaty had but a small influence on the previously existing practice. Arguably, 
the only substantive change concerned the entry into force of accession documents: with the 
abrogation of Article 98ECSC the acceding states did not need to depose the accession document 
with the French government on the day of accession to the ECSC any more, provision that had been 
doomed to be changed anyway because of the fusion of the Communities into one EC.  
This is why it is not surprising that generally the actual regulation of the fourth enlargement, already 
governed by Article O TEU (now Art. 49 TEU) (Bull. EC 6-1992, para 10; Booß and Forman 
(1995): 107) was on the whole in no way different from that of the previous enlargements.  
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The fifth and the last Treaty reform to deal with enlargement regulation was brought about by the 
Amsterdam EU Treaty, which renumbered Article O to Article 49TEU and introduced a reference to 
Article 6(1)TEU (ex. Art. F(1)). From that moment on, only the European states respecting the 
values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law could apply. The introduction of such a reference into the old article might be misleadingly 
taken for a nouvauté, which it was not. In reality it was an incorporation of a long existing practice 
into the text of the Treaty – a reflection of the substantive facet of customary enlargement law of the 
European Union (cf.: II.1.a. (c)).  
1.4. Section one: concluding remarks   
The initial legal regulation of enlargement was extremely complicated: de facto the same 
enlargement was de jure represented as an accession to three different Communities. Moreover, the 
accession to the three communities, which had to be simultaneous, was (judging from the text of the 
Treaty articles alone, not their application) governed by two drastically different principles: 
supranationality (in the case of ECSC) and intergovernmentalism (in the case of EEC and Euratom). 
This triple regulation proved to be unsustainable in practice: too drastic were the differences between 
the instruments to be applied. This led to the creation of a customary European Enlargement law (the 
substance of which will be discussed further), incorporating some elements from both supranational 
and intergovernmental models of regulation and governing the accession to all the three 
Communities equally.(13) The introduction by Article O (now Art. 49 TEU) of a single enlargement 
regulation did not change much in practice. The European Union continued to apply the customary 
regulation born out of disparities between ECSC and EEC/Euratom enlargement articles.  
2. In search for customs: contemporary enlargement practice 
and its reflection in the Treaty   
The regulation of the Union’s enlargements as it stands after the fifth enlargement round can be 
structured as follows:  
1. Substantive facet:  
z application criteria;  
z enlargement principles.  
2. Procedural facet:  
z actors participating in the process, their powers and competences;  
z chronology of enlargement events.  
The Treaty does not regulate all these elements of enlargement law. Thus, following the proposed 
structure, based on the actual enlargement regulation applied during the last enlargement round, it is 
easy to provide examples of how different the Treaty based enlargement law is from that we find in 
practice (i. e. the customary enlargement law).  
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2.1. Substantive facet of enlargement regulation   
Substantive facet of enlargement regulation consists of enlargement principles and enlargement 
criteria. The criteria represent a list of requirements that an applicant country is unable to change 
(like the Geographical location), while the principles consist of a list of positions to which an 
applicant country has to agree in order to have reasonable aspirations for membership.  
It is also possible to illustrate the difference between the principles of enlargement and the criteria on 
the basis of a different rationale. The criteria of enlargement should be met at the time of the 
submission of the application for membership to the Council. If it is not the case, the question of 
adhering to the principles cannot even be raised: the application made by a state that does not meet 
the criteria would be immediately rejected or left unanswered. A situation might arise when an 
applicant country meets the formal criteria but is not ready to adhere to the principles(14) or might 
be ready to adhere to the principles, but does not meet the criteria.(15) In both the cases enlargement 
is impossible. Thus, taken this distinction into account it is possible to agree with Christophe Hillion 
that a country ‘can be eligible but not admissible’ (Hillion (2002): 411).  
2.1.1. Enlargement criteria   
The enlargement criteria are probably the only field of European enlargement law today where the 
wording of the Treaty has incorporated almost all the existing customary regulation.  
The Treaty text lists three basic criteria that an applicant state should satisfy in order to apply for the 
membership of the Union. According to Article 49TEU ‘any European State which respects the 
principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU may apply to become a member of the Union’. Thus the 
criteria are the following:  
a. Statehood;  
b. Europeanness;  
c. ‘freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law’ (Art. 6(1) TEU).  
d. The fourth and the last criterion and the only one outside the wording of the Treaty is 
membership in the Council of Europe.(16)  
At which stage of the development of enlargement process were the criteria formulated? The 
analysis of the past enlargements demonstrates that all of them were in place since the first 
enlargement round.  
The requirement of being a ‘European State’ in order to apply was part of all the enlargement articles 
from the moment of creation of the Communities. The third ‘democracy’ criterion and the criterion 
related to the membership in the Council of Europe were part of unwritten law from the very 
beginning (Kochenov (2004a)). Interestingly, there were attempts to incorporate them into the Treaty 
text even before the creation of EEC and Euratom. Article 49 TEU bears striking similarities to 
Article 116 of the unfortunate Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community 
(EPC),(17) which, upon entry into force was supposed to abrogate Article 89 ECSC.(18) Concerning 
the criteria of enlargement Article 116(1)EPC stipulated that  
Accession to the Community shall be open to the Member States of the Council of Europe and to any 
other European State which guarantees the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
mentioned in Article 3.(19)  
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This Article is interesting due to three important points: firstly the EPC was to be built on the same 
principles as those to be found in the contemporary Article 6(1) TEU;(20) secondly, a logical 
structure introduced by Amsterdam EU Treaty into the ‘accession article’, namely the reference to 
the principles of Article 6(1) TEU is a repetition of the wording of the unfortunate EPC Treaty; and 
thirdly, the EPC Treat clearly shows the importance of the Membership in the Council of Europe, 
which at present is the only criterion of enlargement left outside the wording of the Treaty.  
The substance of the criteria was clarified in the course of five enlargement rounds.  
a. The criterion of Statehood does not represent much of a problem for the majority of European 
states(21) (the exception might be the Vatican City, as the goals of the agreement of Lateran 
establishing it are not entirely in line with those of the EU (Le Roy (1953): 125)).(22) Some of the 
micro states ‘thoroughly consider all implications […] of possible membership in the European 
Union’.(23)  
b. The meaning of ‘Europeanness’ in the context of enlargements is much more difficult to 
determine. It is important to understand that the term ‘European’ is not only defined geographically, 
but also, according to the European Commission, contains socio-cultural understandings.(24) The 
legal scholars generally oppose a purely geographical understanding of ‘European’.(25) On the 
whole, the question ‘what is Europe?’ for the purposes of the EU enlargement law has already been 
answered,(26) based both on the responses by the EU to the applications for membership received
(27) and on the analogy with other bodies, requiring its members to be European States, like the 
Council of Europe, for example (see e. g. Hoffmeister (2002a): 92). This is to say, presumably, every 
member of the Council of Europe could become an EU Member State – or at least apply for 
membership. 
c. The matters are more complicated in the case of the criterion related to democracy and the rule of 
law, which are very difficult to measure (Beurdeley (2003)). It is absolutely clear, however, that 
democracy and the rule of law have been important criteria for membership from the very beginning 
of the European integration. As early as 1952 Robert Schuman stated that ‘cet Europe est ouverte à 
tous les pays européens libre de leurs choix’ (Hoffmeister (2002a): fn. 44), thus referring to a 
dependent position of the countries behind the iron curtain belonging to the Soviet bloc. The fact that 
an applicant country should be a democratic state follows from the history of the European 
enlargements and the relations of the Communities with the associated countries.(28) The 
Association Agreement with Greece, for example, was frozen by the Community after the coup 
d’État of the colonels (Contogeorgis (1978): 23). The dictatorial regime in Spain was the reason for 
which the initial application of Spain to join the community was left unanswered.(29) The 
Commission’s Opinions on the application of accession usually emphasized the importance of 
democratic consolidation in the future Member States. The importance of democracy was underlined 
on numerous occasions, being reflected in the preamble to the EC Treaty,(30) in the opinions of the 
institutions, and in numerous declarations by the Council, Commission and the European Parliament
(31) as well as in the ECJ jurisprudence.(32) 
On one occasion the Commission expressly stated that Article 237 EEC ‘permits the accession of a 
state only if that state is a European State; and its constitution guarantees, on the one hand, the 
existence and continuance of a pluralistic democracy and, on the other hand, effective protection of 
human rights’.(33)  
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Thus, democracy, the rule of law and protection of human rights have always been among the 
necessary conditions for accession to the Union (Community) (Rose and Haerpfer (1995): 428), even 
before the changes introduced to enlargement law at Amsterdam. In other words, Amsterdam 
amendments of Article 49 TEU clearly represent an incorporation of one of the aspects of customary 
enlargement regulation into the text of the Treaty. 
d. Some scholars argue that the Membership in the Council of Europe is a necessary criterion for 
joining the EU, which is reasonable in the light of the values, the Council of Europe shares with the 
EU.(34) It is notable, that the applicant countries often saw the membership of the Council of Europe 
as a necessary step towards the EU membership (Tucny (2000): 28).  
The European Commission explicitly demonstrated that the membership of the Council of Europe is 
a necessary step towards accession to the Union. References to this organisation can be found in 
almost all the Copenhagen related documents released in the course of the preparation of the Fifth 
enlargement. 2002 Commission’s Strategy Paper ‘Towards the Enlarged Union’, for example, points 
at the importance of adherence to international human rights instruments, those adopted by the 
Council of Europe included. Outlining the method of the Commission it states that ‘the Commission 
analyses the way in which the candidate countries respect and implement the provisions of the major 
human rights conventions’.(35) A special accent was made on the documents adopted by the Council 
of Europe, and especially on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).(36) Such an 
attitude to the Council of Europe documents is not surprising. Although not a part of Community 
law,(37) the ECHR, in case applied in the context of the Treaty provisions, represents a source of the 
principles of EC (EU) law, (38) and also possesses ‘special significance’ in the European law 
context, as clarified by the ECJ.(39) Complying with the principles of Article 6(1) (and 6(2)) TEU, 
the candidate countries were expected to ratify the Convention. Thus, in the context of pre-accession 
the ‘adherence to the Convention and its supervisory machinery’ (Shelton (2003): 97), played a very 
important role, making the participation in the Convention ‘the principal – if not the only – objective 
criterion for determining their commitment to respect fundamental rights’ (Lenaerts (2000): 599).  
To summarise, in order to expect its application not to be rejected the applicant country should 
satisfy the following criteria: it should be a Member of the Council of Europe, respecting freedom, 
democracy, the rule of law and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. After the 
amendments introduced by the Amsterdam EU Treaty, all the aforementioned criteria with the sole 
exception of the membership in the Council of Europe can be found in the text of Article 49TEU.  
2.1.2. Principles of enlargement   
The situation with the reflection of the principles of enlargement in the texts of the Treaties is quite 
different from the regulation of the criteria, as not a single principle can be found in the text of the 
TEU enlargement article. Moreover, the set of principles of enlargement is not static, as are the 
criteria, but undergoes considerable changes with every round of enlargement.  
Notwithstanding their dynamic character, the core of the enlargement principles came to life during 
the preparation of the first enlargement: the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK(40) and has 
not changed ever since. They were all formulated in the speech of the Council President in office Mr. 
Harmel opening the way to the first enlargement.(41) Mr. Harmel stated that in order to proceed with 
enlargement the future members have to subscribe to a number of principles, restating point 13 of 
The Hague European Council communiqué of 1 and 2 December 1969.(42) The document stated that 
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[t]he negotiations can only begin in so far as the applicant States accept the Treaties and 
their political aims, the decisions taken since the entry into force of the Treaties and the 
options adopted in the sphere of development (Bull. EEC, 1-1970: 16).  
The applicants accepted these conditions immediately and the first successful enlargement was 
launched. The wording of point 13 of The Hague Council communiqué can be interpreted to contain 
a number of milestone principles of enlargement:  
1. Enlargement consists of joining an existing entity, not the creation of a new community;  
2. The acquis communautaire should be accepted in full;  
3. The transitional periods should be strictly limited and cannot contain serious derogations from 
the Treaty text and the principles on which the Community is built.  
4. During the regulation of the last enlargement, these three principles were joined by another 
one: conditionality.  
None of these principles follows directly from the text of Article 49TEU, although it can be argued 
that their existence stems from the spirit of the Treaties and is a ‘core component of the Community 
method’ (Preston (1997): 18).  
1. The adherence of the candidates to the principles in question during the preparation of the first 
successful enlargement marked a huge step forward compared to the previous unfortunate 
experiences. The first enlargement attempt made by the UK was vetoed by General de Gaulle 
precisely because the UK was not ready to accept the Community legal order, trying to renegotiate 
the Common Agricultural Policy and some other issues (Le Tallec (1972): 232). Thus, in 1970, while 
starting the negotiations anew, this crucial principle of Community enlargement law had to be made 
clear: the new Member States can only be accepted as new members of an already existing Union 
(Community), created by the founding Treaties and thus are unable to modify it, as classical 
international law would presuppose (Brinkhorst and Kuiper (1972): 365; cf.: Maresceau (2001)). The 
acceding states had to accept the terms of the founding Treaties, becoming a part of a developing 
legal order at a certain stage of its evolution (Olmi (1978): 79). It still remains the most crucial 
principle of enlargement, from which at least two other principles follow, namely the acceptance of 
the acquis in full and the temporary and limited character of the transitional periods.  
2. For the purposes of enlargement, the acquis communautaire can be defined as all the body of 
Community regulation existing at the moment of accession. It is also possible to understand the 
acquis as a ‘noyau dur that must be progressively built upon while respecting the rules enshrined in 
the acquis itself’ (Verhoeven (2003): 147). Articles 2(1)5 and 3(1) TEU clearly construe the acquis 
as the most important constitutional core of the Community/Union legal system. This understanding, 
however, is not applicable to the definition of the acquis communautaire as part of the set of 
principles of the enlargement process, which is reasonable, since the acceptance of the core 
principles by the new Member States is not enough to fully integrate into the Community system – 
which brings about a somewhat broader understanding of the acquis for the purposes of enlargement. 
The acquis currently comprises the following elements (cf.: Hoffmeister (2002a): 97; Delcourt 
(2001); Goebel (1995): 1143; Curti (1995)):(43) the Community Treaty, acts adopted,(44) external 
agreements based on them,(45) EU Treaty and acts related to the 2nd and 3rd pillars of the Union,
(46) as well as decisions and agreements of the Council, Article 239 EC conventions, “declarations 
or resolutions or other positions taken by the European Council or the Council” and “positions 
adopted by the common agreement of the Member States”.(47) The case-law of the ECJ also forms 
part of the acquis communautaire.(48)  
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It also comprises the acceptance of the finalités politiques of the Union. Starting from the accession 
of the UK, Denmark and Ireland, the acceptance by the acceding states of the ‘options adopted in the 
sphere of development’(49) was regarded as a very important principle of the enlargement process.
(50) Legally, however, the procedure of this acceptance is far from being clear. Pierre Pescatore 
formulated this principle the following way:  
‘Aux nouveaux venus, […] il faut demander non seulement de définir leur position à 
l’égard des objectifs d’ores et déjà définis et consacrés par des engagements fermes. Il 
faut les interroger aussi sur leurs intentions en ce qui concerne les chances d’une 
évolution ultérieure vers l’union politique’ (Pescatore (1972): at 29; cf.: Soldatos and 
Vandersanden (1968): 689).  
The ECJ, following the spirit of the Acts of Accession also gave the acquis communautaire a very 
broad reading, stating that even the decision of the board of the European school in Luxembourg 
forms part of the acquis.(51)  
The Treaty is also silent on another important point: the candidate countries are not allowed to rely 
on the derogations granted to the existing Member States (Booß and Forman (1995): 118). That is to 
say, in some respects, the acquis, as applied to the newcomers can be wider than that applied to the 
existing members. The most telling examples are the EMU(52) and the Schengen acquis.(53)  
3. As far as the transitional periods are concerned, once again, the Treaty is not really helpful, only 
stipulating that ‘the conditions of admission and adjustments to the Treaties […] shall be subject to 
an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State’(Art. 49(2) TEU). That is to say the 
enlargement article does not contain any detailed rules concerning the limits of adjustments to the 
Treaties. However, taking the previous two principles into account, it is clear that the adjustments 
can only concern purely technical issues (like the readjustments of seats in the institutions) or 
specific matters. In the latter field the adjustments can sometimes give rise to permanent changes 
resulting in some derogations from the acquis.(54)  
The main rule remains that accession cannot give rise to permanent derogations from the acquis or 
initiate policy innovations (Becker (2001): 15; Preston (1997): 19). The candidate country is only 
free to discuss the time-frame of the incorporation of the acquis (cf.: Becker (2001); Granell (1986)), 
which should not postpone the full embrace of any chapter of the acquis indefinitely.(55)  
Strictly speaking, any measure without a time-limit is a ‘measure which amends or repeals the acts 
of institutions otherwise than as a transitional measure’.(56) The fact that some measure is stated in 
the Act without a time limitation only means that it ‘has the same status in law as the provisions 
which [it] repeals or amends and shall be subject to the same rules as those provisions’.(57) The ECJ 
interpreted this provision of the Act (based on the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal) as 
allowing for the change of the dairy quotas stated in the Act of Accession by qualified majority in 
Council almost right after the entry into force of the Act.(58) Commentators explain the position 
taken by the Court by the absence of a strict time limit for validity of the dairy quota for Spain stated 
in the Act (Goebel (1995): 1151, 1152).  
In some cases even simple transitional periods with strictly limited timing can bring harmful 
consequences for the Community legal system at large.(59)  
 
Seite 13 von 34 EIoP: Text 2005-006: Full Text
14.04.2005 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006.htm14
It should be noted that even the technical adjustment of the Treaties can bring a lot of changes, 
affecting the role played by every Member State, shifting the established coalitions in the Council 
and influencing the benefits acquired by each of the Member States from its participation in the 
Union. That is to say any enlargement, however small the adjustments to the Treaties, has far-
reaching system-transformative consequences.(60)  
To summarise, all the enlargements, including the fifth were governed by three main principles. 
None of these principles is reflected in the Treaty instruments regulating the enlargement process. 
Their elaboration had been completed at the time of the first enlargement that resulted in the joining 
of the UK, Ireland and Denmark.  
4. Just as the other three principles, Conditionality is not mentioned in the Treaty text. Its origins lie 
in the specific character of the fifth enlargement, which was not exactly like the previous ones both 
due to the number of applicants (Maresceau (2001): 3) and because of the nature of the majority of 
the new-comers, most of them being ex-communist states.(61) While the Community was prepared 
to deal with poor situation in economies using transitional periods, it had no experience in dealing 
with poor situation in the field of democracy and human rights (Tucny (2000): 23). The Union had 
also become far more complex since the first enlargement round. Being afraid of ‘going to bed with 
bad guys’ (Klabbers (1999): 279) as Jan Klabbers put it and realising the potential threat of ‘dilution, 
or even dislocation, of the integration process’ (Hillion (2002): 401), coming from enlargement, the 
Community tried to get some guaranties that democratisation and economic reform of the Central 
and East European Countries (CEEC) will be a success before these countries can become Member 
States. The best way to ensure the success of political and economic reforms is to control their 
progress, which was done through the newly-introduced pre-accession strategy (Beurdeley (2003): 
43; Hillion (2002): 414; Inglis (2002); Maresceau (2001)) concept.  
In the light of this control idea, the Union established a link between the achievement of certain 
standards in the development of economy, public administration, human rights protection and in 
other spheres and the benefits the applicants could get from the Union. Among those were various 
types of aid and assistance(62) and the ultimate dream of the CEECs – accession to the Union. In 
this respect, the core of the principle of conditionality might remind the conditions for enlargement, 
discussed earlier. However, a difference between the two is clear.  
Firstly, conditionality presupposes that the applicants agree with the Union’s scrutiny of all spheres 
of their legal, political and economic reform and agree to fulfil the demands of the Union, while in 
the case of conditions the Union exercised more or less a one-time judgement of whether an 
applicant fulfils the minimal requirements for membership. Secondly, the demands of the Union 
concerning all aspects of reform are not counterbalanced with the right of the applicants to accede. 
The absence of it has been restated on numerous occasions by the scholars and also follows directly 
from the Treaty text.(63) Thirdly, the principle of conditionality applies throughout the whole of the 
accession process, different groups of conditions are developed by the Union to distinguish if the 
applicants are ready for moving forward with the accession. And finally, the conditionality principle 
allows the Union to exercise an ‘impartial assessment’ of the applicants’ progress towards accession. 
As a result, theoretically, only the most prepared candidates get a chance to join the Union. In 
practice, however, conditionality did not make accession more predictable and clear (Kochenov 
(2004a); Hillion (2002): 402).  
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The Europe Agreements,(64) initially concluded by the Communities with no view of making an 
accession tool out of them, became one of the main instruments in the application of conditionality 
(Inglis (2000)) after the EU formulated clear policy priorities vis-à-vis the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, beginning to regard them as possible future members. But as the main legal basis for 
this principle, the Union applied the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ adopted by the 1993 Copenhagen 
European Council. The criteria were initially designed as a list of three(65) equally important 
elements, ‘complementing the Treaties’ (Tucny (2000): 78):  
1. The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities;(66)  
2. The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union (Bull. EC 6-1993).  
Later on, however, a strict hierarchy of the criteria was introduced. Presidency Conclusions of the 
Luxembourg European Council (12-13 December 1997), held that ‘compliance with the Copenhagen 
political criteria is a prerequisite for opening of any accession negotiations’.(67) The European 
Commission, trying to ‘strik[e] the right balance of keeping up speed [of enlargement] without 
sacrificing quality’,(68) proposed to open negotiations with any applicant satisfying only 
Copenhagen political criteria.(69) Following this recommendation, negotiations were open with all 
the candidate countries,(70) triggering disappointment in some scholarly circles concerned with the 
fact that conditionality is not applied strictly enough (Inotai (2000): 6).  
At the same time, these developments made the conditionality principle instrumental not only for the 
achievement by the applicants of the ultimate goal of accession but also for the movement forward 
along the lines of the accession process: from acceptance of application to the opening of 
negotiations and then, ultimately, to accession. In short, different sets of criteria and principles are 
applied to different stages of the process: in order to apply it is necessary to fulfil minimal 
conditions, later, in order for the negotiations to be opened, Copenhagen political criteria should be 
met and, finally, in order to accede the Union all the remaining criteria related to economic 
development and adoption of the acquis should be satisfied.  
The broad character of the Copenhagen criteria, coupled with ‘underdeveloped notion of democracy 
and purely technical nature of institutions building’ (Anastasakis (2001): 8) leaving many scholars 
sceptical about their workability (e.g. Beurdeley (2003): 35), was supposed to be compensated by a 
number of documents adopted in their implementation. Following requests made by a number of 
European Councils, the Commission not only released the Opinions on the Application for 
membership – which it was supposed to do according to Article 49(1) TEU(71) – but also embarked 
on preparing annual reports on the candidate countries’ progress towards accession (on a country by 
country basis),(72) accompanied by summarising documents,(73) also containing recommendations 
concerning the opening of negotiations and the general assessment of the situation with fulfilment of 
the Copenhagen Criteria. Generally, the tradition of issuing such summary reports started in 1997, 
when a document entitled ‘Agenda 2000’(74) was issued by the Commission to accompany the 
Opinions on the candidates’ application for accession.  
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The role of the Copenhagen-based conditionality was increased even further with the introduction of 
Accession Partnerships.(75) There documents, adopted by the Council on the proposals of the 
Commission in the form of Decisions on the basis of Regulation 622/98(76) changed the nature of 
the Copenhagen criteria. Article 4 of the Regulation made the reception of accession aid conditional 
on their fulfilment, thus introducing the criteria, previously mostly political in nature, into the field 
of legal regulation of enlargements.  
Right after there adoption, it was argued that the criteria only regulate the accession of the CEECs, 
while now it became clear that the conditionality principle is there to stay and all the future 
enlargements will be regulated with a due regard to the Copenhagen criteria (Avery and Cameron 
(1998): 23).  
Undoubtedly being part of the enlargement regulation, conditionality is not regulated by the Treaty. 
Interestingly, its application starts before the moment identified by Article 49 TEU as a starting point 
for enlargement regulation, namely before the submission of a formal application for membership. 
The majority of CEECs submitted their applications in 1994–1996,(77) while the Copenhagen 
criteria were formulated two years earlier (Avery and Cameron (1998): 24).  
Discussing this principle it is possible to see in it a continuation and further articulation of the three 
initial principles of enlargement process: conditionality gives the Union guarantees that the 
obligations assumed by the Member States and stemming from the three ‘traditional criteria’ will be 
met. At the same time, this principle undoubtedly weakened the position of the candidate countries 
vis-à-vis the Union, leaving them no room for manoeuvre (Engelbrekt (2002): 43, 44) and made the 
regulation of enlargements more rigid.(78) Additionally, conditionality also allows the Union to 
choose the most successful applicants and only embrace those who ‘are ready’. Some scholars call it 
a separate enlargement principle of ‘differentiation’ (de la Serre (1994): 20; Maniokas (2000)). Since 
‘differentiation’ is linked to conditionality as such, it might be unreasonable to make it a single 
standing additional principle of enlargement.  
2.2. Procedural facet of enlargement regulation   
The text of Article 49 TEU gives the impression of providing a full regulation of the enlargement 
procedure, naming the actors to participate in the process, their competences and the chronology of 
enlargement events.  
There are two possible misleading interpretations of the Article 49 TEU, both of them seemingly 
naturally following from the text, but having nothing to do with the actual application of the Article. 
Firstly, applying simple textual interpretation of the Article it might be concluded that the text 
implies a chronological division of the enlargement process into two phases:(79) a ‘supranational’ 
phase, where all the Union institutions act, regulated by Article 49(1) TEU and an 
‘intergovernmental’ phase, regulated by Article 49(2) TEU.  
The second possible misleading interpretation does not involve a chronological succession of the 
first and the second parts of the Article. In case the ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ 
involvement in the process were to be understood chronologically, the Council would only be able to 
decide on the start of negotiations between the Applicant State and the Member States – and not on 
the actual enlargement.  
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The non-chronological view of the meaning of the Article is supported by the Rules of Procedure of 
the European Parliament, which stipulate that the EP gives its assent ‘when the negotiations are 
completed but before any agreement is signed’,(80) which means that the Council can only act 
unanimously (which is done upon getting an EP consent and an Opinion of the Commission) after 
the negotiations are completed.  
In practice, however, it is impossible to understand the real enlargement procedure from the text of 
the article alone, without a due regard of the established practice of enlargement regulation, as the 
article does not mention all the actors participating in the process (most notably no mention is made 
of the European Council), and it only provides a superficial account of their powers. Further, these 
aspects of imperfection, inherent in Article 49 TEU will be assessed in greater detail.  
2.2.1. Actors participating in the enlargement process and their powers   
According to Article 49 TEU, alongside the applicant country and the Member States there are three 
participants in the process: the Council (ruling on the application and taking a unanimous decision 
concerning enlargement), the Commission (which should be consulted) and the European Parliament 
(to give assent with an absolute majority of its members).  
In reality, this list also includes the European Council, which has an ultimate power to take key 
decisions in the sphere of enlargement and has a huge influence in the sphere of the regulation of the 
enlargement process. The European Council takes the principle decision to enlarge (Presidency 
Conclusions, 1993 Copenhagen European Council). The European Council also formulated the 
Conditionality principle and drafted the Copenhagen criteria. The entire framework of documents 
and activities related to pre-accession strategy has also been created following requests made by the 
European Council. All the stages of the process are controlled by this organ: the decision to 
accompany the Commission’s Opinion on the CEECs applications for membership with a 
summarizing report, which resulted in the release of the Agenda 2000; the decision to make the 
Commission issue annual Reports on the Candidates’ Progress towards accession, accompanied by 
Composite and Strategy papers; the endorsement of the importance of the Copenhagen political 
criteria for the opening of the negotiations; the very decision to open negotiations (Kochenov 
(2004a): 6). Thus, Article 49 TEU omits to mention one of the key players in the enlargement 
process.  
The role of the Council is also underestimated in the Article: in realty it does not only accept an 
application and decides to enlarge, but also empowers the Commission to play one of the key roles in 
the process (Inglis and Ott (2004): 146). The powers the Council enjoys in the course of accession 
are very broad. It does not only steer the progress of pre-accession – it is also empowered to change 
the rules of the game. The introduction of Accession Partnerships by way of Regulation 622/98 is a 
perfect example of this. Furthermore, all the rounds of the Accession Partnerships adopted by the 
Council de facto represent a clear road-map to accession for the candidate countries. The fact that 
these documents were drafted by the Commission does not change the essential role played by the 
Council in the process by adopting them. Steering the candidate countries’ policies by way of 
adoption of legal documents making accession prospects dependant on the fulfillment of the 
Copenhagen criteria and the priorities set in the Accession Partnerships themselves does not fit 
within the role given to the Council by Article 49 TEU. In other words, the actual role played by this 
organ is much more important than that envisaged by the accession article.  
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The Commission does a lot more than just issuing an Opinion.(81) Some scholars state that it 
sometimes acts outside of the legal framework of enlargement regulation (Beurdeley (2003): 42), 
which is not entirely true, once the customary vision of enlargement regulation is adopted. Acting on 
the mandate of the Council and the European Council, it prepares a whole range of documents 
related to the assessment of the progress made by the candidates. Very importantly, it also prepares 
Accession Partnerships, later adopted by the Council in the form of Decisions. The Commission also 
participates in the negotiations by preparing common positions for the Member States. It is clear that 
the Member States and the community organs are free to disagree with the observations of the 
Commission, but usually they choose not to do so, which makes the Commission the most powerful 
player in the process, playing the ‘leading role’ (Inglis and Ott (2004): 146; Maniokas (2000)).  
The Member States do not in fact play the exact role one might think they should play according to 
Article 49(2) TEU (Beurdeley (2003): 42). Since the first successful enlargement round, the 
procedure to conduct negotiations was defined by a Council decision (Avery and Cameron (1998): 
28) and the negotiations have been conducted by the Member States meeting in the Council(82) (The 
meetings are prepared by COREPER and are conducted at the Ministerial level). The official name 
for the accession negotiation meeting is the ‘Conference for accession to the European Union’, 
which is de jure comprised of all the Member States and a candidate country. In other words, in 
practice all the negotiations are conducted within the Union framework.(83) It reflects the 
compromise between the approaches adopted by Article 98ECSC, where Member States were not 
supposed to have any role to play, and the original EEC/Euratom enlargement regulations.  
It seems that only the role played by the European Parliament in the enlargement process is reflected 
fully in the text of the enlargement article.(84)  
To summarise, the Article does not reflect the real situation in enlargement regulation, introduced 
with the first round of enlargement several decades ago.  
2.2.2. Chronology of enlargement events   
A similar situation exists in the regulation of chronology of enlargement process. Numerous 
chronologies have been proposed by enlargement scholars, starting with Soldatos, Vandersanden and 
Puissochet, who discussed the possible interpretations of the ‘phase structure’ of the Treaty 
enlargement instruments. Later, chronologies were drafted in order to trace a real sequence of 
enlargement events as opposed to the chronology to be found in the Treaties. Probably the most 
detailed of them is made by Booß and Forman concerning the fourth enlargement – accession of 
Finland, Austria and Sweden (Booß and Forman (1995): 104). Frank Hoffmeister reproduces it as a 
table (Hoffmeister (2002a): 101). Other authors to pay attention at the chronology problem are 
Avery and Cameron (Avery and Cameron (1998): 24).  
The fifth enlargement brought in an additional enlargement principle of conditionality, which could 
not pass unnoticed, thus affecting an established Booß and Forman-type chronology and adding 
complexity to the process.(85) Being based on the regulation of the four previous enlargements, all 
the chronologies cited do not include the pre-accession strategy elements. That is to say a new 
enlargement chronology description is needed.  
Based on the regulation of the fifth enlargement it is possible to sketch the following chronology of 
enlargement events:  
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1. The aspirant members demonstrate their willingness to join the EU.  
2. The Union recognizes their desire and launches assistance programmes.  
3. The European Council rules on enlargement and formulates the criteria.  
4. The aspirant members submit applications to the Council and conduct national reforms in 
accordance with the criteria formulated by the Council.  
5. The Council accepts or rejects the application (unanimously) and asks the Commission to 
issue an Opinion on the application.  
6. The Commission issues an Opinion on the application, accompanied by a summary report and 
recommends starting negotiations.  
7. The European Council reacts to the Commission’s assessment and asks for yearly reports and 
summary papers.  
8. The start of negotiations. The Commission proposes and the Council unanimously adopts the 
common positions to be taken by the Union in the negotiations.  
9. The Council regularly issues Accession Partnerships drafted by the Commission, the candidate 
countries has to alter national reforms accordingly.  
10. Conclusion of negotiations between the Member States meeting in Council and the applicant 
country. (Theoretically suspension of negotiations is possible in case the country seizes to 
satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria).  
11. Assent of the European Parliament.  
12. Unanimous Act by the Council.  
13. Signing of the Accession Treaty by governments of the Member States and of the candidate 
Country.  
14. Ratification of the Treaty in the candidate countries and in the Member States.  
15. Entry into force of the Accession Treaty.  
16. The accession is completed when all the transitional periods are over.  
Only a small number of its elements are mentioned in Article 49 TEU.  
3. Dual Regulation of Enlargements and the European 
Constitution  
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe follows the path of the Treaty instruments 
formally regulating the enlargement process at present. The Constitutional Treaty contains an Article 
which will substitute Article 49 TEU once the Treaty enters into force: Article I-58. The Article 
mostly repeats the wording of Article 49 TEU and reads as follows:  
1. "The Union shall be open to all European States which respect the values referred 
to in Article I-2, and are committed to promoting them together.  
2. Any European State which wishes to become a member of the Union shall address 
its application to the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the 
Member States’ national Parliaments shall be notified on such application. The 
Council of Ministers shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. The conditions and 
arrangements for admission shall be the subject of an agreement between the 
Member States and the candidate State. That agreement shall be subject to 
ratification by each contracting State, in accordance with its respective 
constitutional requirements."  
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Interestingly, the Constitutional Treaty does not contain any special procedure to be used by those 
states that left the Union in accordance with Article I-60 and are willing to rejoin. According to 
Article I-60(5) of the Constitution a standard I-58 procedure should apply in such cases.  
The changes in the wording, compared to Article 49 TEU are really minimal. However, there are 
several important observations to make. The most important change concerns the structure of the 
Article. The implicit reference to the two phases of the enlargement process inherent to the structure 
of Article 49 TEU, was excluded from the text, by including all the procedural aspects of 
enlargement regulation to be found in the Treaty into Article I-58(2). It is a very positive 
development, which reflects the customary regulation of the chronology of enlargement events by 
eliminating the possibility of ‘misleading’ interpretations of the enlargement article, addressed 
above. Certainly, it makes the article more understandable. The second change is giving the national 
Parliaments a role to play. The nature of their participation is, however, very formal. They are only 
notified on the application, meaning that they do not enjoy any power in the regulation of 
enlargements. The reasons for inclusion of such a clause are thus unclear.  
More generally, what follows from the draft Constitution is a clear reluctance to use yet another ideal 
opportunity to codify enlargement practices. Although, after restructuring, the text of the Article is 
clearer than that of Article 49 TEU, the proposed amendment does not include the majority of the 
elements of customary enlargement regulation. In a way, Article I-58 bears only slight differences 
from the initial EEC Article 237.  
The Constitution Treaty drafters had an opportunity to rewrite the article in its entirety, but chose not 
to do so. That is to say the drafters preferred to leave the co-existence of double customary / Treaty 
law regulation of enlargements intact. Viewed from this perspective it can be argued that the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe follows the path of previous Treaty revisions, marked by 
reluctance to codify all the existing customary practices, picking only the most important elements of 
customary regulation for inclusion into the Treaty text.  
On concubinage: customary enlargement law and written 
enlargement law of the European Union (as a conclusion).  
It is true that the scope of enlargement regulation was constantly growing, introducing new rules, 
principles and conditions governing the process. It is also true, however that this growth was going 
alongside the lines of the main principles and criteria, formulated from the very beginning. In other 
words, the roots of enlargement law remained unchanged from the very beginning and the evolution 
of some particular details of enlargement regulation only led to gradual clarification the main 
principles and criteria, present among the legal tools of enlargement regulation since the very first 
round of enlargement.  
Thus enlargement regulation, although growing in scope and detail, represents a consistent picture of 
development along the main lines, set during the first enlargement round and is not marked by any 
unexpected turns and revolutionary changes.  
Importantly, this consistency of application of enlargement law and constant evolution of the 
enlargement principles and criteria were achieved by the European Union in the atmosphere of 
vagueness of the Treaty text related to the regulation of this matter. Thus the Treaty only marks a 
starting point of enlargement law and does not hold monopoly on enlargement regulation.  
Seite 20 von 34 EIoP: Text 2005-006: Full Text
14.04.2005 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006.htm21
The development of enlargement regulation throughout five rounds of enlargement and numerous 
Treaty changes demonstrate that some core principles crucial for enlargement law today were 
formulated in the course of the first enlargement and were not rooted in the enlargement articles of 
the Treaties then in force.  
The most crucial aspects of enlargement law such as, for example, the requirement to accept the 
acquis communautaire in full or the roles de facto played by the Union organs in the process can be 
traced back to the agreement between the UK and the then EEC on the crucial points of enlargement 
law reflected in the Hague Communiqué of 1969, which was not a legal document per se. The 
substance of the procedural aspects of enlargement law now in force can also be traced back to the 
first enlargement and is mostly rooted in the crucial differences between the regulation of 
enlargements contained in the ECSC and EEC (together with Euratom) Treaties. As the paper has 
demonstrated, none of the procedural solutions contained in the Treaties was fully applied in the 
course of any enlargement process. The Communities and, later, the Union de facto applied the 
norms formulated in an almost ad hoc manner during the first enlargement. The fact that such 
procedural norms distant from both the de jure intergovernmental standard to be found in the EEC 
and Euratom Treaties and the de jure supranational standard of Article 98 ECSC were applied, also 
finds proof in the contemporary enlargement regulation. Although rooted in Article 237 EEC, as 
applied, Article 49 TEU does not substantially differ from the application of the three enlargement 
articles that regulated three pre-Maastricht enlargements.  
In other words, in contrast with the Treaty text regulating enlargements (which changed five times in 
the course of five enlargements), the essence of the European enlargement law as applied remained 
largely unchanged and was only getting more detailed due to some legal instruments not mentioned 
in the enlargement article (such as the Regulation 622/98) and quasi-legal mechanisms applied by 
the enlargement actors in a manner not prescribed in the Treaty articles. In short, EU enlargement 
law, although rooted in the Treaty, is very much different from what is prescribed by the Treaty 
article now in force. And so it has been in the course of all the five enlargement rounds.  
If not the Treaty alone, what regulated the enlargements? It can be suggested that alongside the 
Treaty regulation, which is responsible for establishing the very option for the EU to enlarge, 
European enlargements have been regulated by unwritten law. One might consider calling this 
unwritten law customary enlargement law of the European Union.  
Since no literature on European customary law exists to date, an analogy with international 
customary law should be made, in order to establish or dismiss the possibility of customary 
enlargement regulation. As stated supra the main elements of customary law in public international 
law are the actual practice of regulation, its uniformity, generality and duration, and opinio juris et 
necessitatis, or a belief that an activity is legally binding (Shaw (2003): 80; Brownlie (2003): 8). 
This definition fits very well to the practice of the European enlargement regulation. Indeed, with the 
Treaty text available, enlargements were de facto regulated differently from what is stated in the 
Treaty and the candidate countries were not trying to invoke literal interpretations of the enlargement 
articles (which were discussed supra as ‘misleading’), understanding quite well that it is The Hague 
communiqué and the practice of previous enlargements that really matters in the legal regulation of 
the enlargement process. 
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Since the main principles of enlargements and criteria the candidate countries have to satisfy 
remained largely unchanged in the course of all the five enlargement rounds (with a sole exception 
of conditionality, which, however, appears to be a continuation of other principles applied), it can be 
stated that based on the experience of all the five enlargement rounds the customary enlargement law 
has been applied consistently and certainly amounted to a regulation crucially different from what 
one finds in the Treaties. The fact that the application of enlargement customary law was getting 
more detailed is not an argument against its consistent application, since none of the principles 
governing the first enlargement has been abolished or lost its legal force. Moreover, the willingness 
of the candidate countries to play along with the Union in the application of the customary 
enlargement law is a sign that it has been considered binding by all the actors participating in the 
process. In other words, all the elements inherent to customary law, are present in the legal 
regulation of EU enlargements.  
What makes the European customary enlargement law unique is its application alongside the Treaty 
text and a constant interaction between the customary law and written enlargement law of the 
European Union, which occurs mostly through incorporation of customary legal norms into written 
enlargement law. One can cite examples of incorporation of the elements of the customary law both 
into the primary law and ‘soft law’ of the European Union. As an example of the former, one can 
name the introduction into Art. 49 TEU of a reference to Art. 6(1) TEU at Amsterdam, which is the 
first codification of a long standing enlargement principle that only democratic states respecting 
human rights and the principle of the rule of law can join the Union (Kochenov (2004a)), which has 
been consistently applied within the auspices of customary enlargement law throughout four rounds 
of enlargement. In search of an example of the latter it is possible to turn to the third Copenhagen 
criterion, stating that the candidate countries should be ready to accept the obligations of 
membership, i. e. the implementation of the acquis communautaire, a principle, consistently applied 
throughout all enlargement rounds and not making part of the Treaty article regulating enlargements. 
Although certainly making part of EU law, customary enlargement law has a number of specific 
features, mostly related to the legal specificity of the enlargement process. Following the text of the 
Article 49 TEU it is clear that EU enlargement law has an articulated international law component 
and that the negotiations play an important part in the process of accession. The fact that any 
Accession Treaty is largely a result of negotiations between the candidate country and the Member 
States reduces the impact of ‘classical’ EU law principles on the process of accession. Clearly, the 
negotiating parties are constrained by the principles and criteria of enlargement law, both customary 
and stemming from the Treaty text. On the other hand, in case of breach, of either customary or 
Treaty-based components of enlargement law it is unclear how the enforcement of enlargement law 
would work. Although Article 49 TEU is formally subject to the ECJ’s jurisdiction according to 
Article 46(f), the Court demonstrated its reluctance to rule on the issues related to the regulation of 
enlargements. In Mattheus v. Doego, referring to the negotiations element contained in Article 237 
EEC (now Art. 49 TEU), it found that ‘the legal conditions for accession remain to be defined in the 
context of that [Art. 237 EEC] procedure without its being possible to determine the content 
judicially in advance’.(86) In other words, the Court respects the position of the Member States and 
is unwilling to substitute the basic procedure included into the enlargement article by its own 
decisions. Unwilling to restrict the Member States in their negotiating powers, the ECJ basically 
allows for a very flexible interpretation of the enlargement article and is unlikely to put any 
constraints on the application of the customary enlargement law (which may otherwise be viewed as 
a misapplication of Article 49 TEU).  
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On the other hand, whether the ECJ will be willing to stand for the customary enlargement law in 
case the outcome of accession negotiations led to a serious breach of the enlargement customary law 
and resulted, for example, in important permanent derogations from the acquis for the new Member 
State, remains unclear.  
To summarise, enlargement enjoys a dual regulation: both by the Treaty and by customary law. The 
existence of the core customary law explains the consistency of enlargement regulation throughout 
all the rounds of this process, notwithstanding the stage of the Treaty reform in force at the time of 
every particular accession. The future enlargements are likely to be building on the body of 
customary law in force to date. The process of gradual incorporation of customary law into the 
written law of the EU is also likely to continue.  
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